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Class-Action Tolling, Federal Common Law,
and Securities Statutes of Repose:
A Recommendation
Wendy Gerwick Couture*
This Essay focuses on a narrow, but potentially outcomedeterminative, question: Does the filing of a securities class action toll
the three-year outer time limit applicable to claims under sections 11
and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and the five-year outer time limit
applicable to claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
such that potential class members-after a decision on class
certification-can assert an individual federal action, even if those
outer time limits would have elapsed absent tolling? There is currently
a circuit split on this issue, with the Tenth Circuit answering "yes" and
the Second Circuit answering "no." Although the Supreme Court
initially granted certiorari to resolve this issue, it later dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted, leaving behind a vigorous debate
between advocates of institutional investors and those of securities
defendants, as well as among scholars.
This Essay makes the unique argument that these outer time limits,
properly characterizedas statutes of repose, should be tolled if class
certification is denied but not if class certification is granted. To reach
this conclusion, this Essay builds on the work of several eminent civil
procedure scholars who have argued that class-action tolling is a
creature of federal common law, drawn from the federal policies
underlying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, federal statutes of
limitations, and the relevant federal legislative scheme. Then, picking
up where these scholars have left off, this Essay argues that, in the
context of securities class actions, the policies underlying Rule 23, the
securities statutes of repose, and the securities laws merit this Essay's

* Wendy Gerwick Couture is an Associate Professor at the University of Idaho College of
Law, where she teaches securities regulation and white-collar crime. She thanks Loyola
University Chicago's Institute for Investor Protection and the Institute for Law and Economic
Policy for sponsoring this worthwhile discussion, her fellow panelists for sharing their thoughtprovoking comments, and the Loyola University ChicagoLaw Journal for editing and publishing
her remarks.
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INTRODUCTION

I am delighted to join this discussion about the new landscape of
securities fraud class actions, including the future of opt-out litigation.
In this Essay, I focus on a narrow, but potentially outcomedeterminative, question: Does the filing of a securities class action toll
the three-year outer time limit applicable to claims under sections 11
and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and the five-year outer time limit
applicable to claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
such that potential class members-after a decision on class
certification-can assert an individual federal action, even if those outer
time limits would have elapsed absent tolling? There is currently a
circuit split on this issue, which has left institutional investors-those
investors with the means and incentive to file individual actionsreeling as they seek to protect their claims in the event that certification
is denied and as they seek to defend their ability to opt out of a class
settlement in the event certification is granted.
The players in securities litigation are, unsurprisingly, divided on this
issue along party lines, with the Business Roundtable 1 and the
Securities Industry Financial Markets Association 2 arguing against

1. See Brief for Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Pub.
Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2014 WL
3704559, at *4 (arguing that statutes of repose should "cut off liability absolutely once the
statutory period has run").
2. See Brief for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 1, Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
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tolling these outer time limits, and with the American Association for
Justice 3 and various public and private pension funds 4 arguing in favor
of tolling. In this Essay, I make a recommendation that will likely
satisfy neither side of this debate. In particular, I argue that these outer
time limits should be tolled if class certification is denied but not if class
certification is granted. To reach this conclusion, I pick up where the
civil procedure scholars on class-action tolling have left off, arguing
that unique features of securities litigation merit this bifurcated
approach.
This Essay proceeds in five additional parts. In Part I, I summarize
the Supreme Court precedent on class-action tolling, focusing on the
seminal case American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,5 which
applied class-action tolling to an antitrust statute of limitations. In
particular, I identify the four prongs of the American Pipe Court's
analysis: (1) after the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, class-certification decisions occurred at an earlier point in
the case, preventing potentially abusive "one-way intervention" and
undercutting a rationale for declining to toll; (2) Rule 23's purposes of
efficiency and economy would be undercut if, absent tolling, potential
class members were forced to make protective filings; (3) the purposes
of statutes of limitations would not be undercut by tolling; and (4)
tolling would be consistent with the federal antitrust legislative scheme.
In Part II, I present the issue of whether American Pipe tolling
applies to the three-year outer time limit applicable to claims under
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and the five-year outer
time limit applicable to claims under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act. As a component of this presentation, I answer the
preliminary question of whether these outer time limits are properly
characterized as statutes of limitations or statutes of repose. I argue,
drawing on the Supreme Court's recent guidance on this distinction in

1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2014 WL 3704558, at *1 ("[T]here should be clear rules providing a
time within which a claim must be asserted, so that defendants can then seek to resolve it, and
after which defendants (and their shareholders) are free from the fear of lingering liabilities.").
3. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Am. Ass'n for Justice in Support of Petitioner at 1, Pub.
Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2014 WL
2361895, at *1 ("[The] commencement of a class action asserting claims under the Securities Act
of 1933 suspends the Act's three-year time limit as to all asserted class members.").
4. See Brief of Pub. and Private Pension Funds as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3,
Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2014
WL 2361892, at *3 ("American Pipe rule is part of a sound structure of class and individual
litigation, and it is particularly important to public and private pension funds.").
5. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 544 (1974).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 45

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,6 that these outer time limits are statutes of
repose because they run from the defendant's last culpable act, not from
the later accrual date. As such, these statutes of repose implicate
different purposes than statutes of limitations do. In particular, they
further the goal of affording the securities defendant freedom from
liability after a certain point in time.
In Part III, I discuss the circuit split on the issue of whether American
Pipe tolling applies to the three- and five-year statutes of repose,
identifying at the heart of the circuit split confusion about the source of
American Pipe tolling. On the one hand, if class-action tolling is
equitable, then its applicability to the securities acts' statutes of repose
7
is barred by Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.
On the other hand, if class-action tolling is based on an interpretation of
Rule 23, then it potentially violates the Rules Enabling Act's mandate
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right." 8 After identifying this confusion about
the source of American Pipe tolling, I argue that both potential sources
are incorrect.
Instead, relying on significant support from civil
procedure scholars, I argue that American Pipe tolling is a creature of
federal common law, drawn from the federal policies underlying Rule
23, federal statutes of limitations, and the relevant federal legislative
scheme.
In Part IV, starting with the premise that American Pipe tolling is a
product of federal common law, I draw from the four prongs of the
American Pipe decision to propose the following framework to analyze
whether to extend class-action tolling to the securities acts' statutes of
repose: courts should adopt class-action tolling of the securities acts'
statutes of repose if (1) it would not allow for "one-way intervention";
(2) it would further the Rule 23 purposes of efficiency and economy by
preventing a "multiplicity of activity"; (3) it would not frustrate the
repose policy of allowing the defendant freedom from liability after a
certain period of time; and (4) it would be consonant with the securities
acts' legislative scheme. I recognize that this framework has the
potential to create a tolling rule that is not trans-substantive, but I argue
that this potentiality is consistent with the appropriate balancing of the
federal interests at issue.
In Part V, I apply this proposed framework to the securities acts'
statutes of repose, drawing on unique features of securities litigation and

6. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2189 (2014).
7. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
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differentiating between securities cases in which certification is denied
and those in which certification in granted. I argue that, pursuant to this
framework, class-action tolling should apply to the securities acts'
statutes of repose if certification is denied but not if certification is
granted. Under this recommendation, if a class were not certified, all
potential class members would benefit from class-action tolling of the
repose period to file individual actions. If a class action were certified
after the repose period has elapsed, however, class members would not
be able to rely on tolling in order to opt out of the class. In short, before
the period of repose has elapsed, potential class members would have to
decide whether to stick with the class to the extent that it is certified or
to go it alone. I acknowledge that this recommendation has the
potential to limit opt-out plaintiffs' ability to exercise their "exit" option
at the time of settlement, but I argue that this "exit" option is not
rendered completely toothless because often securities counsel and
institutional investors are repeat players in securities litigation.
Finally, I briefly conclude, identifying several unanswered questions,
including whether investors who opt out of federal class actions can rely
on tolling of state statutes of repose when asserting state-law claims in
state court.
I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON CLASS-ACTION TOLLING

Class-action tolling derives from the 1974 Supreme Court case
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, in which putative class
members sought to intervene as plaintiffs in an antitrust suit under the
Clayton Act after the district court declined to certify the class action
because the class failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement. 9 The
district court denied the putative class members' motions to intervene
because the limitations period had elapsed between the time that the
class action suit was filed and the time that class certification was
denied. 1 0 The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the filing of the
class action suit counted as commencement of the suit within the
Clayton Act's statute of limitations for all putative class members.1 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that "the
commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute
for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to
intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action

9. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 544.
10. Id.
11. Id.at 545.
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status."
The Supreme Court's analysis in American Pipe was four-pronged.
First, the Court recognized that the running of the statute of limitations
against potential class members during the pendency of the class
action-while perhaps necessary to curb the potential for abuse under
the pre-1966 version of Rule 23, which allowed for so-called "spurious"
class actions-was no longer necessary to prevent abuse under the post1966 version of Rule 23.13 Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23,
members of the claimed class could wait until a late stage of the case,
perhaps even until final judgment, before deciding whether to
participate in the case. 14 These spurious class actions allowed for, in
effect, "one-way intervention," whereby members of a class could
benefit from a favorable judgment without being bound by an
unfavorable one. 15 One way to counter that potential for abuse was to
force potential class members to make a decision one way or another
before the limitations period had elapsed. 16 The 1966 amendments to
Rule 23 eliminated the problem of one-way intervention by requiring
the district court to rule on class certification "[a]s soon as practicable
17
after the commencement of an action brought as a class action."
Therefore, the Court reasoned that, post-1966, "the difficulties and
potential for unfairness which, in part, convinced some courts to require
individualized satisfaction of the statute of limitations by each member
... 18
of the class, have been eliminated.
Second, the Court reasoned that, if the statute of limitations were not
tolled for putative class members between the time of filing and a
decision on class certification, the Rule 23 goals of efficiency and
economy would be undercut. 19 Absent tolling, "[p]otential class
members would be induced to file protective motions to intervene or to
join in the event that a class was later found unsuitable." 20 This
"multiplicity of activity" is exactly what Rule 23 was designed to
prevent. 2 1
Third, the Court rejected the argument that tolling the statute of

12. Id. at 553.
13. Id. at 545-51.
14. Id. at 547 (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1937)).
15. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 547.
16. Id. at 549.
17. Id. at 547 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) (1966)).
18. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550.
19. Id. at 551-54.
20. Id. at 553.
21. Id. at 551.
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limitations between the time of filing and a decision on class
certification would interfere with the purposes of a statute of
limitations. 2 2 The Court identified two purposes of a statute of
limitations: (1) ensuring fairness to a defendant by providing the
defendant with adequate notice before "memories have faded" and
"witnesses have disappeared"; 23 and (2) barring a plaintiff who has
"slept on his rights."'2 4 The Court stated that the first purpose is served
by the mere filing of the class action because, within the limitations
period, "the defendants have the essential information necessary to
determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation,"
regardless of whether the case proceeds as a class action. 2 5 The Court
stated that the second purpose is served because the named plaintiff, as
26
a representative of the class, has been sufficiently diligent.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the federal courts lack
the power to toll the Clayton Act's limitations period because it would
be an impermissible extension of a procedural rule to abridge a
substantive right, in violation of the Rules Enabling Act. 27 The Court
rejected this framework, instead stating that "[t]he proper test is not
whether a time limitation is 'substantive' or 'procedural,' but whether
tolling the limitation in a given context is consonant with the legislative
scheme." 28 In a footnote, the Court stated that tolling the statute of
29
limitations was indeed consonant with the Clayton Act.
After American Pipe, the Supreme Court has twice extended its
reach, first to cases in which class certification is granted and second to
potential class members' individual suits. First, in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, decided just a few months after American Pipe, the Court
confirmed that a named plaintiff in a class action bears the burden, postcertification, of providing notice to all potential class members in order
to allow them an opportunity to opt in or opt out. 30 In so ruling, the
Court rejected the named plaintiff's argument that this notice was
unnecessary because "class members will not opt out because the statute
of limitations has long since run out on the claims of all class members
22. Id. at 554-55.
23. Id. at 554 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 34849 (1944)).
24. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554 (quoting Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428
(1965)).
25. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555.
26. Id. at 554-55.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
28. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 557-58.
29. Id. at 558 n.29.
30. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-80 (1974).
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other than petitioner." 3 1 The Court stated that American Pipe, "which
established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable
statute of limitations as to all members of the class," foreclosed this
argument. 32 Therefore, Eisen extended class-action tolling from cases
in which class certification is denied, as in American Pipe, to cases in
which class certification is granted. Second, in Crown, Cork & Seal
Co., Inc. v. Parker, the Court held that American Pipe tolling applies,
not only to an individual class member's motion to intervene in the
original action, but also to a potential class member's individual
action. 3 3 The Court reasoned that, otherwise, "[a] putative class
member who fears that class certification may be denied would have
every incentive to file a separate action prior to the expiration of his
own period of limitations. ' 34 These protective filings would result in
the same inefficiency and multiplicity of actions that Rule 23 and
35
American Pipe sought to prevent.
II.

PRESENTATION OF ISSUE: APPLICABILITY OF CLASS-ACTION
TOLLING TO SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

Against this backdrop, the open question is the applicability of classaction tolling in securities class actions, and, in particular, to the outer
time limits applicable to securities claims. Under section 13 of the
Securities Act, section 11 claims may not be asserted "more than three
years after the security was bona fide offered to the public," and section
12(a)(2) claims may be not be asserted "more than three years after the
sale." 36 Under section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, claims under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act must be brought no later than "5
37
years after such violation."
This issue is not merely academic. To the contrary, in light of the
extensive pre-suit investigation necessitated by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), 3 8 the lead plaintiff selection

31. Id. at 176 n.13.
32. Id.
33. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983).
34. Id. at 350-51.
35. Id. at 351.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2012).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c); id. § 78u-4(c); see, e.g., City of Livonia Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Boeing
Co., No. 09-C-7143, 2014 WL 4199136, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2014) ("This kind of 'shoot
first, aim later' practice, whereby [Plaintiffs'] attorneys wait until after the complaint is filed to
'conduct an investigation that [they] should have conducted before filing [the] lawsuit,' has
already been criticized in this District ....
[T]he source should have been interviewed before the
complaint was filed. Plaintiffs' counsel's failure to interview Singh before filing their securities
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procedure mandated by the PSLRA, 39 and the protracted nature of
motion-to-dismiss litigation in securities cases (encouraged by the
PSLRA's stringent scienter pleading requirement), 4 0 class-certification
41
decisions are often made after these outer time limits have elapsed.
Indeed, according to a recent study of securities class actions filed in the
period from 2002 through 2009, section 13's three-year time period
elapsed prior to a certification decision in seventy-three percent of cases
that asserted claims under only section 11 or section 12 of the Securities
Act and that reached a certification decision. 4 2 The same study found
that the five-year time period applicable to section 10(b) claims elapsed
prior to a certification decision in forty-four percent of cases that
43
asserted section 10(b) claims and that reached a certification decision.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. ("Halliburton IF'), which invites an expert witness
battle at the class certification stage about price impact, 44 will likely
further extend the period of time between filing and a decision on class
certification in cases asserting section 10(b) claims.
At the outset, it is necessary resolve whether these outer time limitsthe three-year period applicable to sections 11 and 12(a)(2) claims and
the five-year period applicable to section 10(b) claims-are properly
characterized as statutes of limitations or statutes of repose. This
characterization is important, not because American Pipe tolling is
fraud complaint constitutes a failure to conduct a reasonable pre-filing investigation as required
by the PSLRA.").
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(3); id. § 78u-4(a)(3).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(a); see Wendy Gerwick Couture, Around the World of Securities
Fraud in Eighty Motions to Dismiss, 45 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 553 (2014) (discussing the
omnipresence of motions to dismiss in securities litigation and the high prevalence with which
those motions are asserted, and succeed, on the basis of the failure to plead a strong inference of
scienter).
41. The argument, proffered by the Business Roundtable, that plaintiffs' attorneys should
simply be more diligent in bringing suit in a timely fashion in order to prevent these outer time
limits from elapsing before a certification decision is highly questionable in light of the PSLRA's
role in mandating and encouraging these delays. See Brief for Business Roundtable as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2014 WL 3704559, at *4 ("Any need for urgency comes not
from slow judicial resolution, but from dilatory conduct by class-action and other plaintiffs in
filing suit with too little time remaining on the repose clock.").
42. Brief of Civil Procedure & Securities Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 4-7, Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014)
(No. 13-640), 2014 WL 2361893, at *4-7. This Essay's author was not a signatory to this brief.
43. Id. at 8-10.
44. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton 11), 573 U.S.
,
134 S. Ct.
2398, 2417 (2014) ("[D]efendants must be afforded an opportunity before class certification to
defeat the [fraud on the market] presumption [of reliance] through evidence that an alleged
misrepresentation did not actually affect the market price of the stock.").
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necessarily confined to statutes of limitations, but because statutes of
repose implicate different policy considerations than statutes of
limitations do. Therefore, any analysis of the applicability of American
Pipe tolling to statutes of repose must encompass those policy
considerations.
Helpful to the resolution of this issue, the Supreme Court in CTS
Corp. v. Waldburger recently expanded its guidance on the distinction
between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. 4 5 According to
the Court, a statute of limitations ordinarily creates a time limit "based
on the date when the claim accrued," 4 6 while a statute of repose is
measured "from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the
defendant." 4 7 A statute of limitations furthers the policy goals
articulated in American Pipe4 8 of ensuring fairness to defendants "by
preventing surprises through [plaintiffs'] revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared" and of requiring plaintiffs to be
diligent. 49 A statute of repose, on the other hand, "effect[s] a legislative
judgment that a defendant should 'be free from liability after the
legislatively determined period of time." 5 0 In other words, "a statute of
51
repose can be said to provide a fresh start or freedom from liability."
Applying this guidance to the outer time limits applicable to claims
under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 10(b), these time limits are
appropriately characterized as statutes of repose, thus implicating the
policy concern of giving securities defendants a fresh start after a
legislatively determined period of time. The three-year outer limit
applicable to section 11 claims begins to run when the security is "bona
fide offered to the public," and the three-year outer limit applicable to
section 12(a)(2) claims begins to run with "the sale."'52 In both
instances, this is the last culpable act by the defendant, not the accrual
of the claim. The claim does not accrue, at the very earliest, until the
truth emerges, demonstrating the existence of an earlier
misrepresentation. The shorter one-year limitations period contained in

45.

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2178-79 (2014).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009)).
47. CTS Corp., 134S. Ct. at2182.
48. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing the policy goals articulated in
American Pipe).
49. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2183 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)).
50. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2183 (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions § 7 (2010)).
51. Id.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).

46. Id. at 2182 (quoting
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section 13, which begins to run upon "the discovery of the untrue
statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence," approximates this later
accrual date. 53 The five-year outer limit applicable to section 10(b)
claims begins to run with "the violation." Again, this is measured by
the defendant's last culpable act, 54 not by the accrual of the claim,
which does not occur-at the earliest-until the truth emerges,
demonstrating the existence of the earlier violation. The shorter threeyear limitations period applicable to section 10(b) begins to run upon
"discovery of the facts constituting the violation," which the Supreme
Court has interpreted to include "facts a reasonably diligent plaintiff
would have known" in addition to those actually known by the
56 (Of
plaintiff.55 This discovery date approximates the date of accrual.
note, it is currently unsettled whether this shorter three-year limitations
period begins to run upon the plaintiff's reasonable discovery of the
facts showing the elements of falsity, materiality, and scienter, or upon
the potentially later date of the plaintiff's reasonable discovery of the
facts showing the elements of reliance and loss causation. 57 Regardless
of how this unsettled issue is resolved, however, this later "discovery"
date approximates claim accrual, while the earlier "violation" date
coincides with the defendant's last culpable act.) Therefore, when
analyzing whether American Pipe tolling applies to these outer time
limits, it is necessary to consider whether the repose rationale of
granting the securities defendant freedom from liability after a certain
period of time is consistent with class-action tolling.

53. Id.
54. See McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 2011) ("A bit of further
evidence that 'violation' in section 1658(b) does not require injury is that the SEC can bring an
enforcement action for a 'violation' of federal securities law without anyone having suffered
harm, which is to say without anyone having relied on a misrepresentation or misleading
omission to his detriment.").
55. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1) (2012).
57. Merck & Co., 559 U.S. at 649 ("We consequently hold that facts showing scienter are
among those that 'constitut[e] the violation.' In so holding, we say nothing about other facts
necessary to support a private § 10(b) action." (citing Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 12 n.1, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2009) (No. 08-905),
2009 WL 3439204, at *12)). The United States' amicus brief suggested that facts concerning a
plaintiff's reliance, loss, and loss causation are not among those that constitute "the violation" and
therefore need not be "discover[ed]" for a claim to accrue. Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra, at 12 n.1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1)); see Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) ("For one thing, as a matter of pure logic, at
the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase
payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instantpossesses equivalent value.").
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CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING APPLICABILITY OF CLASS-ACTION
TOLLING TO SECURITIES STATUTES OF REPOSE

There is currently a circuit split about whether American Pipe tolling
applies to the section 13 statute of repose, with the Tenth Circuit
holding that the three-year period is tolled during the pendency of the
59
class action 58 and with the Second Circuit holding that it is not.
Although neither case addressed section 10(b)'s five-year statute of
repose, in recognition of the similarity between the three-year statute of
repose in section 13 and the five-year statute of repose applicable to
section 10(b) claims, lower courts have applied this circuit precedent by
extension to section 10(b) claims. 60 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve this circuit split in Public Employees' Retirement
System of Mississippi v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 6 1 but later reversed course,
dismissing the writ as improvidently granted. 62 Thus, this issue remains
63
unresolved.
At the heart of the confusion about American Pipe tolling's
applicability to securities statutes of repose is disagreement about the
source of American Pipe tolling: equity, Rule 23, or something else. If
American Pipe tolling is equitable in nature, then under the Supreme
Court's holding in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, it does not apply to statutes of repose. 64 The Tenth Circuit
rejected the argument that American Pipe is grounded in equity, 65 while
the Second Circuit cited Lampf as one of two alternative grounds for its
holding that American Pipe tolling does not apply to section 13's statute

58. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000).
59. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of the City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 109 (2d
Cir. 2013).
60. E.g., In re Bear Steams Cos. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 995 F. Supp. 2d 291, 303
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (relying on IndyMac to hold that American Pipe tolling does not apply to section
10(b)'s five-year statute of repose).
61. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014).
62. Id.
63. A review of the extensive briefing of the parties and amici in IndyMac is beyond the scope
of this essay. But see Linda S. Mullenix, Securities Class Actions: For Whom the Bell Tolls
(Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 569, 2014),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2517487.
64. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991)
(holding that equitable tolling was inconsistent with the three-year statute of repose, which is
contained in various provisions of the Securities Act, including section 13, and which, prior to the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, applied to section 10(b) claims "[b]ecause the purpose of
the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutoff').
65. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Lampf and Anixter are not
relevant in the present context because the tolling that Mr. Joseph seeks is legal rather than
equitable in nature.").
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of repose.
The contention that American Pipe tolling is equitable in nature is
shaky. For one, the Court did not even cite American Pipe in Lampf.
Additionally, while the Court discussed equitable tolling in American
Pipe to counter the argument that the Court lacks the power to toll
statutes of limitations, 6 7 the Court did not suggest that class-action
tolling is likewise grounded in equity. Indeed, none of the four prongs
of American Pipe's analysis is premised on the notion that the potential
class member would be unfairly disadvantaged by the absence of tolling
or that the class action defendant has acted unfairly so as to compel
tolling. 6 8 To the contrary, the Court expressly stated that class-action
tolling applies even to plaintiffs who do not know about the pendency
69
of the class action.
If American Pipe tolling is based on an interpretation of Rule 23, then
tolling is valid only if it does not run contrary to the Rules Enabling
70
Act's prohibition on a procedural rule's abridging a substantive right.
The Second Circuit, as one of two alternative grounds for its holding
that American Pipe tolling does not apply to section 13's statute of
repose, stated that, if grounded in Rule 23, class-action tolling would
violate the Rules Enabling Act because it would deprive the defendant
of the substantive right to freedom from liability after a proscribed
period of time. 71 The Tenth Circuit held that American Pipe tolling was
"legal" rather than "equitable," without expressly indicating whether the
legal source was Rule 23 or something else and without analyzing the
Rules Enabling Act. 72
The contention that American Pipe tolling is based on an

66. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of the City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 109 (2d
Cir. 2013) ("If the tolling rule is properly classified as 'equitable,' then application of the rule to
Section 13's three-year repose period is barred by Lampf ... ").
67. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559 (1974).
68. Id. at 545-51.
69. Id. at 551 ("We think no different a standard should apply to those members of the class
who did not rely upon the commencement of the class action (or who were even unaware that
such a suit existed) and thus cannot claim that they refrained from bringing timely motions for
individual intervention or joinder because of a belief that their interests would be represented in
the class suit.").
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.").
71. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d at 109 ("[T]he statute of repose in Section 13 creates a
substantive right, extinguishing claims after a three-year period. Permitting a plaintiff to file a
complaint or intervene after the repose period set forth in Section 13 of the Securities Act has run
would therefore necessarily enlarge or modify a substantive right and violate the Rules Enabling
Act.").
72. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1167 (10th Cir. 2000).
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interpretation of Rule 23 is likewise shaky. Nothing in the text of Rule
23 compels tolling, and the Court's analysis in American Pipe was four73
pronged, with only the first two prongs based on Rule 23 policy.
Additionally, although the Court in American Pipe addressed the
contention that class-action tolling would violate the Rules Enabling
Act, the Court rejected the Act's substance/procedure framework in
favor of an analysis of whether tolling "in a given context is consonant
with the legislative scheme."'74 If the Court in American Pipe were truly
engaging in an analysis of the Rules Enabling Act, it would have
applied its standard analysis for distinguishing between substance and
procedure for purposes of the Rules Enabling Act-whether the rule
governs only the "manner and the means" by which the litigant's rights
are "enforced" or whether it alters "the rules of decision by which [the]
75
court will adjudicate [those] rights."
Further, in Shady Grove OrthopedicAssociates. v. Allstate Insurance
Co., the Supreme Court stated that it had "rejected every statutory
challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us" and cited its prior
precedent in support of this proposition; yet the Court did not cite
American Pipe,76 suggesting that-despite the brief discussion of the
Rules Enabling Act in American Pipe-the Court itself does not view
American Pipe tolling as an interpretation of Rule 23.
In addition, the Court's subsequent reasoning in Chardon v. Soto is
inconsistent with the contention that Rule 23 compels American Pipe
tolling. 77 In Chardon, the Court analyzed the effect of tolling in a class
action asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because no federal statute of
limitations applied to § 1983 claims, the Court looked to state lawhere, the law of Puerto Rico-to determine the limitations period, the
availability of tolling, and the effect of tolling. 7 8 All parties agreed that
class-action tolling applied to the case; thus the Court did not disrupt the
First Circuit's holding that class-action tolling applied because Puerto
Rico had adopted it.79 The Court did address, however, the effect of

73. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court's discussion of tolling
in American Pipe and its relation to Rule 23).
74. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 557-58.
75. Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946) (citation omitted); see
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (reaffirming that
this is "[t]he test" to determine whether a Federal Rule withstands challenge under the Rules
Enabling Act).
76. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-65 (1965);
Miss. Publ'g Corp., 326 U.S. at 445-46).
77. Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983).
78. Id. at 662.
79. Id. at 658.
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that tolling. Puerto Rico's class-action tolling rule allowed the statute
of limitations to begin running anew upon denial of class certification,
while under American Pipe tolling, the statute of limitations merely
resumes upon denial of class certification. 80 The Court held that Puerto
Rico's running-anew rule applied, rejecting the contention that
American Pipe "established a uniform federal procedural rule applicable
to class actions brought in the federal courts." 8 1 Therefore, the Chardon
Court's reasoning is inconsistent with the contention that American Pipe
tolling is compelled by an interpretation of Rule 23.82 Indeed, the
83
Chardondissent criticized the majority opinion for this very reason.
Finally, if class-action tolling were compelled by Rule 23, it would
pose serious concerns under the Rules Enabling Act, even when applied
to statutes of limitations, 84 as most starkly visible when applied to state85
law claims in class actions based on diversity jurisdiction.
Therefore, the question remains: if not equity and not Rule 23, what
is the source of American Pipe tolling? Only by resolving this question
can courts determine whether class-action tolling applies to securities
statutes of repose. This Essay explores a third option, proposed by
several eminent civil procedure scholars, that American Pipe tolling's
source is federal common law. The Second Circuit did not address this
argument. The Tenth Circuit, by characterizing American Pipe tolling
as "legal" but without identifying the legal source, may have viewed
American Pipe tolling as a product of federal common law, albeit
without so stating explicitly. The Tenth Circuit's failure to analyze
whether class-action tolling of repose periods would violate the Rules
Enabling Act is consistent with the view that the source is federal
common law.

80. Id. at 650.
81. Id. at 658-62 (quoting Brief of Petitioner, Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983) (No. 82271), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 797, at *24)).
82. Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Normal Menachem Feder, The Impropriety of Class Action
Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 532, 556 (1996)
("Although the doctrine clearly relates to, and is supported by, the Rule 23 class action device, it
is perhaps better thought of as a rule of federal common law. By insisting that American Pipe
had not announced a uniform tolling doctrine in all federal court class actions, the Chardon
majority certainly seemed to embrace this view.").
83. Chardon, 462 U.S. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he source of the tolling rule
applied by the Court was necessarily Rule 23.").
84. Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's"Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1012, 1027 (1989) (arguing that "Rule 23
does not and could not validly provide a tolling rule").
85. Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 82, at 549 ("But even assuming Rule 23 explicitly
embraced the tolling provision announced in American Pipe, it would not be valid under the
Enabling Act-at least not as applied to state law claims.").
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ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: CLASS-ACTION TOLLING

As FEDERAL COMMON

LAW

Civil procedure scholars Stephen B. Burbank and Tobias Barrington
Wolff have argued that American Pipe tolling, rather than grounded in
equity or in an interpretation of Rule 23, is a product of federal common
law, developed based on the federal policies underlying Rule 23 and the
federal substantive statute at issue. 86 As Professors Burbank and Wolff
explain, "[w]hen the underlying law is federal, the role of federal judges
in shaping the relationship between remedial structures and substantive
policy objectives is unproblematic: it is coextensive with their role as
expositors of federal common law."'87 Indeed, this explanation for the
source of class-action tolling, unlike an explanation grounded in equity
or Rule 23 itself, encompasses the four prongs of the American Pipe
Court's analysis, which considered the policies underlying Rule 23, the
policies underlying federal statutes of limitations, and the federal
legislative scheme. 88
Therefore, understanding that American Pipe tolling is a rule of
federal common law derived from the federal policies underlying Rule
23, federal statutes of limitations, and the federal legislative scheme,
courts should apply this same framework to analyze whether classaction tolling applies to the securities acts' statutes of repose. Indeed,
the "Brief of Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari" in the IndyMac case
proposes exactly this approach:
Rather, the validity of an application of American Pipe to a limitations
period would instead turn, as the Court instructed, on a broader and
more textured inquiry that takes account of the "legislative scheme,"
including the limitations provision in question, and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure potentially in conflict with that provision, and the

86. See Burbank, supra note 84, at 1027 ("Rule 23 does not provide a rule for tolling the
applicable limitations period, state or federal, in a class action brought in federal court, and
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah does not suggest otherwise. In that case, the Supreme
Court was making federal common law. Both the governing substantive law and the applicable
limitations period were federal." (footnotes omitted)); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 49-50
(2010) ("Rule 23 was not the source of the limitations-tolling rule that the Court announced in
American Pipe ....Rather, the application of Rule 23 in those proceedings was the occasion for
the Court to implement class action policies in federal common law that it was otherwise
authorized to make." (footnotes omitted)); accord. Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 82, at 556
("Although the [American Pipe tolling] doctrine clearly relates to, and is supported by, the Rule
23 class action device, it is perhaps better thought of as a rule of federal common law.").
87. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 86, at 67 (footnote omitted).
88. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text (summarizing and discussing the four
prongs of the Court's analysis in American Pipe and the foundation behind them).
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statutory scheme governing the litigation, and asks whether applying
American Pipe would be consonant with each. 89

When engaging in this "broader and more textured inquiry," courts
should apply the four prongs of the American Pipe analysis in order to

decide whether to adopt class-action tolling of the securities acts'
statutes of repose as a rule of federal common law.
In particular, courts should adopt class-action tolling of the securities
acts' statutes of repose as a rule of federal common law if: (1) it would
not allow for "one-way intervention"; (2) it would further the Rule 23
purposes of efficiency and economy by preventing a "multiplicity of
activity"; (3) it would not frustrate the repose policy of allowing the
defendant freedom from liability after a certain period of time; and (4) it
would be consonant with the securities acts' legislative scheme.
This federal common law approach, in addition to being consistent
with the analysis in American Pipe, would dispel federalism concerns
about applying American Pipe tolling to state-law claims asserted in

diversity class actions. If the source of American Pipe tolling is federal
common law rather than Rule 23, the Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins
Test, 90 rather than the Rules Enabling Act, would govern whether

91
American Pipe tolling applies to state law claims.

Under Erie,92

federal courts would likely defer to state tolling rules in diversity
actions.

93

89. Brief of Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1515 (2014) (No. 13-640), 2013 WL 8114524, at *16. This Essay's author was not a signatory to
this brief.
90. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
91. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965) (differentiating between cases in which a
Federal Rule conflicts with a state rule, which are analyzed under the Rules Enabling Act, and
cases outside the scope of a Federal Rule, which are analyzed under Erie); see Adam N.
Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism:Erie and the Rules Enabling Act after Shady Grove, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1131, 1160 (2011) ("Imagine this scenario: Shady Grove is ultimately
certified as a class action. Eventually the case proceeds to a favorable judgment for the plaintiff
class, at which point ten thousand class members step forward to claim the statutory damages to
which they are entitled. Allstate moves to dismiss the vast majority of these claims as timebarred, arguing that the limitations period expired while the litigation was still pending. Under
the American Pipe rule, that motion would fail. But Rule 23, however, does not address the
extent to which a class action tolls the limitations period for unnamed class members. Thus a
federal court would face a relatively unguided Erie choice." (footnote omitted)).
92. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 ("The 'outcome-determination' test therefore cannot be read
without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." (footnote omitted)).
93. Lowenthal & Feder, supra note 82, at 557 ("While the competence of federal courts to
create federal common law has, of late, been a magnet for academic comment, there seems to be
little doubt that, for state law claims, the Rules of Decision Act and Erie pose limitations.
Although there may not be unanimity on what those limits are, the rule we are contemplating-
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The viability of this federal common law approach is admittedly
subject to several criticisms. First, although the Court engaged in a
textured policy analysis when extending the reach of American Pipe
tolling to potential class members' individual actions in Crown, Cork &
Seal Co.,94 the Court did not do so when extending the reach of
American Pipe tolling to potential class members' claims after the
denial of class certification in Eisen.95 Rather, in Eisen, the Court
summarily extended the reach of American Pipe tolling, without
discussing the purposes of Rule 23, the policies underlying statutes of
limitations, or the relevant legislative scheme (in that case, the antitrust
and securities laws). 96 One possible explanation for this summary
approach in Eisen is that the Court concluded that federal statutes of
limitations serve comparable roles in all federal statutes, and thus do not
necessitate an individualized analysis each time that American Pipe is
applied to toll federal statutes of limitations.
Second, although Eisen suggests that this textured approach would
reach the same result for all federal statutes of limitations, the approach
itself invites the possibility that American Pipe tolling is not transsubstantive, even across federal statutes, because its applicability
includes as a component of its analysis consonance with the relevant
legislative scheme. Applied to statutes of repose then, it opens the
possibility that American Pipe would apply to toll the statutes of repose
of some federal statutes but not others. The response to this criticism is
to reject the notion that federal common law affecting procedure, such
as class-action tolling, must be trans-substantive. Indeed, Professor
Wolff has argued that a variety of apparently procedural class action
decisions-including the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes97-are in fact rules of federal common law influenced by the
substantive law at issue in the case. 9 8 Under this approach, "[w]hen
American Pipe applied to displace state law on state law claims-would seem to fall distinctly
outside of everyone's vision of what federal courts can do." (footnotes omitted)); see Casey v.
Merck & Co., 653 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[W]e now join the majority of our sister courts
that have addressed the issue in holding that a federal court evaluating the timeliness of state law
claims must look to the law of the relevant state to determine whether, and to what extent, the
statute of limitations should be tolled by the filing of a putative class action in another
jurisdiction.").
94. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1983).
95. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 176 n.13 (1974).
96. See id. at 175-77 (applying American Pipe to the facts of the case).
97. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011).
98. Tobias Barrington Wolff, ManagerialJudging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
1027, 1034 (2013) ("[T]he academy has been too quick to assign the opinion [in Dukes] broad
trans- substantive meaning. The Court's discussion of the commonality issue in Dukes is
grounded in Title VII policy and speaks primarily to the federal common law of disparate impact
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judges must determine whether to constrain or authorize expansive and
unprecedented forms of litigation in class or mass-tort adjudication,
they can use the goals of the underlying substantive law in disputes
before them as guideposts for their decisions." 99 Therefore, although
applying a textured framework to determine whether class-action tolling
applies to the securities acts' statutes of repose is not a trans-substantive
approach, this approach is consistent with "the dynamic nature of the
relationship that frequently exists between the mechanisms of litigation
and the underlying substantive law." 10 0
V. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK
TO SECURITIES STATUTES OF REPOSE

Accepting that American Pipe tolling is a rule of federal common
law, all that remains is to analyze whether applying class-action tolling
to the securities acts' statutes of repose: (1) would not allow for "oneway intervention"; (2) would further the Rule 23 purposes of efficiency
and economy by preventing a "multiplicity of activity"; (3) would not
frustrate the repose policy of allowing the securities defendant freedom
from liability after a certain period of time; and (4) would be consonant
with the securities acts' legislative scheme. Because the implications of
class-action tolling differ when class certification is denied and when it
is granted, this Essay analyzes each scenario separately, concluding that
class-action tolling should apply to the securities acts' statutes of repose
when class certification is denied and that class-action tolling should not
apply when class certification is granted.
In the scenario in which class certification is denied, this framework
supports tolling the securities acts' statutes of repose. First, tolling the
securities acts' statutes of repose for potential class members would not
allow for potentially abusive "one-way intervention." Although Rule
23 now merely requires a decision on class certification "[a]t an early
practicable time" 10 1 as opposed to "[a]s soon as practicable," this
change does not defer class certification so late as to suggest a return to

remedies under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The handful of statements on Rule 23 and
commonality play only an equivocal role in the analysis. The Court's treatment of Rule 23(b)(2),
in contrast, does speak to core questions of class-action policy. Even so, the substantive policies
underlying the dispute played a major role in the Court's determination that a (b)(2) action was
unavailable, albeit a role that the Court itself left largely unexplored. The constraints that Dukes
imposes upon class-action practice are inextricably tied to a series of express and implied
holdings under Title VII and should be approached with that substantive focus in mind.").
99. Id. at 1069.
100. Id.at 1027.
101. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
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the spurious class actions that existed pre-1966. 102 Upon denial of class
certification, a potential class member could decide to seek to join the
suit as a named plaintiff or file an individual suit. At that point, the
potential class member would not be weighing a potential class
recovery against an individual recovery, invoking the concerns about
one-way intervention, because there would not be a potential class
recovery on the table. Second, absent tolling, potential class members
would be forced to file duplicative motions to intervene or file
individual suits, lest class certification be denied after the repose period
has elapsed, foreclosing any remedy. This multiplicity of activity, like
that described by the Court in American Pipe, would frustrate the Rule
23 purposes of economy and efficiency. Third, tolling would not
undercut the repose policy of affording the securities defendant freedom
from liability after a certain point. Tolling would merely enable the
disaggregated assertion of claims previously asserted in the putative
class action. Finally, tolling would serve the securities acts' dual
purposes of deterrence and compensation 10 3 by ensuring that violators
of the securities acts would not escape liability by virtue of a lengthy
period between the filing of a class action and a certification decision
(of which, to some degree, the very same violators could be the
architect) 104 and that injured investors would not be left without
compensation merely because too much time had elapsed before the
court reached a decision on class certification.
In the scenario in which class certification is granted, on the other
hand, this framework does not support tolling the securities acts'
statutes of repose. First, tolling the securities acts' statutes of repose for
potential class members would enable them to engage in something akin
to "one-way intervention." Because class certification in securities
actions ordinarily triggers a proposed class settlement, if the securities
acts' statutes of repose were tolled, potential class members would be in
the position to examine the class settlement and then decide at that point

102. FED. R. CiV. P. 23 adv. comm. notes accompanying 2003 amendments ("The 'as soon as
practicable' exaction neither reflects prevailing practice nor captures the many valid reasons that
may justify deferring the initial certification decision.").
103. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Collision Between the First Amendment and Securities
Fraud, 65 ALA. L. REv. 903, 960 (2014) ("Although the primary goal of the prohibition on
securities fraud is to deter fraud, it also serves the secondary interest of compensating injured
investors.").
104. See Kevin M. LaCroix, Guest Post: Class Certification Timing and the IndyMac MBS
Case in the Supreme Court, D&O DIARY (July 8, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/07/
articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-class-certification-timing-and-the-indymac-mbs-case-in-th
e-supreme-court/ (recognizing the potential for defendants "to drag their heels in the course of
pre-trial proceedings").
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whether to go it alone or not. 10 5 Securities attorneys have characterized
this as a "no risk, 'wait-and-see' approach." 106 This approach
implicates the American Pipe Court's concern about the potential for
abuse if "members of the claimed class could in some situations await
developments in the trial or even final judgment on the merits in order
to determine whether participation would be favorable to their
interests." 107 Second, the absence of tolling in cases in which class
certification is granted would not trigger a multiplicity of protective
filings. Only those potential class members with the means and
incentive to potentially achieve a better result in an individual action
would file individual actions. 10 8 One commentator has suggested that
the tipping point may be around $50 million in damages among
aggregated institutional investors in an opt-out action. 109 Moreover,
allowing opt-out plaintiffs to pursue individual actions after
certification, by virtue of tolling of the statutes of repose, would
undercut the economy and efficiency sought to be furthered by the class
action mechanism itself.110 Third, applying tolling in cases in which a
105. See AMIR ROZEN, JOSHUA B. SCHAEFFER & CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, CORNERSTONE
(2013) ("Out of
1,272 securities class action settlements between January 1, 1996, and December 31, 2011, we
identified 38 cases in which at least one plaintiff opted out of the class action settlement and
pursued a separate case against the defendant."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and
Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why "Exit" Works Better Than "Voice," 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 407, 437 (2008) ("To date, opt outs have largely occurred after a class action settlement
has been reached."). This reality is recognized by numerous client alerts published by members
of the securities bar. See, e.g., Nicole Lavallee, PracticalMatters: When Should Funds Opt Out
of a Class Action?, BERMAN DEVALERIO, http://www.bermandevalerio.com/news/firm-newslette
r/67-practical-matters-when-should-funds-opt-out-of-a-class-action (last visited Mar. 26, 2015)
("More likely, however, a fund would decide to opt out at settlement time. At this point, funds
will know the dollar amounts involved - the plan of allocation as well as the attorney fees - and
can assess whether their recovery share is reasonable and adequate.").
106. BLAIR A. NICHOLAS & IAN D. BERG, PLI, WHY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS OPT-OUT
OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS AND PURSUE DIRECT INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 2 (2009)
(prepared for publication and distribution at the Securities Litigation & Enforcement Institute
2009).
107. Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974).
108. See Note, Statutes of Limitations and Opting Out of Class Actions, 81 MICH. L. REV.
399, 428 (1982) (hereinafter, Note, Statutes of Limitations) ("The relative infrequency of opting
out would seem to rebut any argument of numerous protective filings. The threat of such activity
seems little more than a trace of the problem faced in American Pipe, where the denial of
certification left class members with no remedy unless they had previously filed protective
motions.").
109. Coffee, supra note 105, at 436.
110. Note, Statutes of Limitations, supra note 108, at 428-29 ("In fact, a decision to allow
tolling would significantly encourage the waste of judicial resources, contrary to the policies
behind class actions. The opt-out tolling decision only arises where the court already has
determined the suit is maintainable as a class action. In reaching this conclusion, the court has
made a finding that 'aclass action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
RESEARCH: OPT-OUT CASES IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 1
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class is certified would undercut the repose rationale of allowing the
defendant freedom from liability at a certain point. The defendant
would be forced to defend against-not only the certified class-but
also various later-filed individual actions. 11 1 Finally, tolling the statutes
of repose when a class is certified, although consistent with the
deterrence rationale underlying the securities acts, would arguably
undercut the compensation rationale, at least for those class members
with negative-value claims such that they have no viable option but to
remain within the class. Opt-out settlements, for a variety of reasons
separate from the merits of the case-including, perhaps most
significantly, the absence of insolvency constraints in the settlement of
opt-out cases1 1 2-often result in a greater percentage of recovery per
dollar of loss than class settlements. 113 Class action defendants, in
recognition of this potential second wave of opt-out liability if statutes
of repose were tolled, would likely attempt to decrease the amount of
the class action settlement by more than the proportionate share of the
opt-outs, either through express provisions in the settlement
agreement1 14 (if permitted by the courts 115) or through hold-backs from

adjudication of the controversy.' The court, after considering 'the interest of the members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions,' and the efficiency of
alternative procedures, has decided the class action objectives will be achieved. By opting out,
the plaintiff ignores this determination. The plaintiff insists on a second trial on essentially the
same facts and issues with all the inefficiencies and inconsistencies avoided by a class suit."
(footnotes omitted)).
111. See Kevin M. LaCroix, Opt-Outs: A Worrisome Trend in Securities Class Action
Litigation, INSIGHTS, Apr. 2007, at 4 ("Even if the number of opt-outs does not forestall a class
settlement altogether, it could still substantially increase the total litigation cost. If a defendant
must defend itself against both a class action and multiple individual lawsuits, the costs of
defense and of ultimate case resolution could escalate, potentially enormously."); Paul Weiss,
Client Memorandum: Second CircuitHolds that American Pipe Tolling Does Not Apply to the
Securities Act's Statute of Repose, PAUL WEISS (June 28, 2013), http://www.paulweiss.com/pract
ices/litigation/securities-litigation/publications/second-circuit-holds-that-american-pipe-tolling-do
es-not-apply-to-the-securities-act's-statute-of-repose.aspx?id=13939 ("If institutional investors
are now forced to file their actions earlier, this might obviate the problem of having to negotiate a
class settlement only to find that large numbers of class members have decided to opt out.").
112. Coffee, supra note 105, at432.
113. ROZEN, SCHAEFFER & HARRIS, supra note 105, at 1 ("Based on limited anecdotal
evidence, opt-out settlement plaintiffs may succeed in obtaining a larger recovery than would
have been received by remaining part of the class action (although opt-out plaintiffs may also face
higher proportionate costs, and we have also identified instances where the opt-out plaintiff failed
to recover any losses)."); Coffee, supra note 105, at 414 ("[C]lass members who opt out and flee
the class seem to do extraordinarily better than those who remain within the class.").
114. Coffee, supra note 105, at 440 ("A more effective way to protect the corporation from
opt outs would be a provision that reduced the settlement amount in respect of each opt out. But
here, because the typical opt out recovers more than the typical class member, the corporate
defendant would need to set the amount of the reduction at a level well above the amount that the
opt out would have received under the class action if the defendant is to be held harmless. Thus,
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the settlement at the outset.11 6 Therefore, opt-out claims would not
operate to increase the size of the pie for investors overall; rather, they
would merely carve out larger slices for those investors with the means
and incentives to opt out, to the detriment of negative-value claimants.
For the same reason, although the deterrence rationale would not be
undercut by tolling the statutes of repose when a class is certified, the
deterrence rationale would be enhanced only slightly. Class action
defendants would still incur the same amount of liability, with any
enhanced deterrent effect only by virtue of the increased costs
associated with defending against multiple suits rather than a single
class action.
In sum, applying the federal common law framework from American
Pipe to the securities acts' statutes of repose, courts should adopt classaction tolling in cases in which class certification is denied and should
decline to adopt class-action tolling in cases in which class certification
is granted. This bifurcated approach differs from the approach that the
courts currently apply to federal statutes of limitations, as compelled by
Eisen, although there is some scholarly support for this bifurcated
approach even in the context of statutes of limitations. 117 Nonetheless,
this bifurcated approach is consistent with the unique policies
underlying Rule 23, statutes of repose, and the securities laws.
One anticipated criticism of this bifurcated approach is that, in cases

hypothetically, the class settlement amount might be reduced, for example, by five times the
amount that the opt outs would have received under the settlement. Although such a tactic does
hold the corporation harmless, there is now a significant cost to opting out that falls heavily on
the smaller shareholders who remain behind within the class. Such a tactic will not deter opting
out, but it will shift the cost of their gains to the remaining class members.").
115. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REv. 288, 327 (2010) ("Third, opt-outs should reduce the smaller class members'
recovery only when defendants negotiate disproportionate reductions to reflect the opt-outs or
impose complex and onerous claim filing requirements. Such tactics are, however, subject to
judicial control if courts are alerted to them.").
116. ROZEN, SCHAEFFER & HARRIS, supra note 105, at 5 ("[1]f larger shareholders are
expected to opt out of a settlement, defendants may offer less money to settle with the class. This
could result in a two-tiered settlement, in which smaller shareholders are significantly
disadvantaged." (footnote omitted)); Securities Class Action Opt-Out Claims: A Growing
Problem, BAILEY CAVALIERI LLC 2-3, http://www.baileycavalieri.com/73-Securities Opt
Out Claims.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) ("From the perspective of the defendants and their
insurers, this means they must negotiate the class settlement without knowing what additional
money will be required to defend and settle possible opt-out claims. Since both the company
defendant and the insurers typically have finite amounts dedicated to resolve the litigation, it is
now very difficult to evaluate what is a reasonable amount to pay for settlement of the class
action and how much should be held in reserve for the unknown but likely opt-out claims.").
117. Note, Statutes of Limitations, supra note 108, at 403-04 ("This Note argues that one who
opts out of a class action should not benefit from tolling for the time during which the individual
was a class member.").
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in which class certification is granted after the relevant repose periods
have elapsed, class members who have not previously filed individual
actions would effectively lose their "exit" option, leaving them with
only their "voice" to ensure that the class settlement is fair and
adequate. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. has written about the value of
the "exit" option to "stimulate greater competition and compel class
attorneys to become more faithful champions" of members of the
class. 118 This criticism is countered, at least somewhat, by two
considerations in the context of securities class actions. First, the
PSLRA mandates certain additional disclosures to class members as
part of a proposed settlement, 119 arguably enhancing class members'
ability to effectively exercise their voice in opposition to a class
settlement under Rule 23(e)(2). Second, class counsel and institutional
investors (who are those investors with the means and incentive to opt
out) are repeat players in securities litigation. 120 Therefore, although
class counsel might not be incentivized to champion the class by an
institutional investor's ability to opt out of a class settlement achieved in
the instant case, class counsel would be well aware that, if the
institutional investor were displeased with the class settlement in the
instant case, the institutional investor would be more likely to file a
timely individual action in future cases in which counsel serves as class
counsel. Therefore, although the exit option would be undercut
somewhat if statutes of repose were not tolled in cases in which a
securities class action is certified, it would not be rendered toothless.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this Essay contends that American Pipe tolling is
properly understood as a rule of federal common law, developed based
on the policies underlying Rule 23, the policies embodied in the
relevant time limit, and the relevant federal liability scheme. Whether
class-action tolling should apply to the securities acts' statutes of repose
depends, therefore, on whether it: (1) would not allow for "one-way
intervention"; (2) would further the Rule 23 purposes of efficiency and
economy by preventing a "multiplicity of activity"; (3) would not
frustrate the repose policy of allowing the defendant freedom from

118. Coffee, supra note 105, at408.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(7) (2012); id. § 78u-4(a)(7).
120. Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1489, 1529 (2006) ("These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors that potentially may act as
lead plaintiffs tend to develop repeat relationships with only a handful of the top-tier plaintiff law
firms.").
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liability after a certain period of time; and (4) would be consonant with
the securities acts' legislative scheme. Applying this framework, this
Essay argues that class-action tolling should apply to the securities acts'
statutes of repose when class certification is denied and that class-action
tolling should not apply when class certification is granted.
Left open by this Essay is the degree to which a federal securities
class action operates to toll statutes of repose applicable to state law
claims asserted in state court. Because state discovery, pleading, and
liability standards are often more advantageous than federal standards,
many opt-out plaintiffs proceed in state court rather than federal
court. 12 1 In addition to the question of whether state courts should
adopt class-action tolling of state statutes of repose, the availability of
tolling in these state opt-out cases will depend on whether the relevant
state (1) recognizes cross-jurisdictional tolling (here, from federal court
to state court); 122 and (2) recognizes cross-claim tolling (here, from
federal securities claims to state law claims). 12 3 State courts have found
American Pipe tolling persuasive, however, in the context of state
statutes of limitations, suggesting that the federal courts' resolution of
whether class-action tolling applies to the federal securities acts'
statutes of repose will influence the future resolution of these important
issues by state courts.

121. Coffee, supra note 105, at 430 ("[B]y opting out and suing in state court, plaintiffs can
escape obstacles that either uniquely apply to class actions or to securities actions in federal court.
The most obvious example is the [PSLRA], whose provisions, including its stay on discovery, its
heightened pleading standards, and presumption in favor of cost shifting against the plaintiff,
apply only in federal court. Also, state 'blue sky' statutes often do not require plaintiffs to plead
or prove scienter.").
122. See John J. Koltse, Cross JurisdictionalTolling of the Statute of Limitations in Antitrust
Claims: Plaintiffs Lose Their Day in Federal Court, 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 20, 20 (2006)
("State supreme courts have wrestled with the related question of whether the filing of a federal
class action tolls the statute of limitations for class members who seek to file subsequent state law
claims after their federal class action is dismissed, reaching opposing outcomes." (citing
authority)).
123. Compare Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 720 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Notwithstanding the
differences between the legal theories advanced by plaintiffs in the state court action and those
advanced in the present action, we are persuaded that the American Pipe doctrine has
applicability to the present action ....
American Pipe tolling is properly extended to claims of
absent class members that involve the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as were involved
in the initial putative class action."), with In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782, 794 (7th
Cir. 2006) ("However similar or dissimilar the function of federal antitrust law may be with
respect to state law, the federal claim is part of a distinct body of law that must be pursued in a
wholly different court system. This fact cuts decisively against the application of the policies of
American Pipe across jurisdictional lines to respond to state class actions, even if some federal
interest in such an application could be divined.").

